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DICKINSON LAW REVIEWVO
LEGISLATION
EFFECT OF THE MARRIED WOMEN'S ACTS ON RIGHTS OF
CREDITORS OF TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETIES
The so-called Married Women's Property Act of 19451 provides that a mar-
ried woman shall have the same contractual capacity as an unmarried woman, ex-
cept that she may not convey her property without the joinder of her husband.
The obvious purpose was to remove those contractual disabilities of a mar-
ried woman which had existed under the previous laws relating to her capacity to
convey and to contract. Nevertheless, some of our lower courts still are refusing
to accept bonds executed by a husband and wife, where it appears they are sure-
ties or accommodation makers, whose sole property is held as tenants by the en-
tireties. It also has been pointed out that some attorneys have advised banks or
other clients not to accept notes on which a husband and wife sign as anomalous
or accommodation indorsers when it appears that the bulk of their property is held
in an estate by the entireties. Our purpose here is to determine whether this re-
luctance can be justified in the light of existing law.
The doubt as to the legality of instruments, wherein the wife signs in a ca-
pacity which supposedly has been opened to her under the Act of 1945, can be
traced to three possible reasons:
(1) The peculiar nature of an estate by the entireties, (2) the possible con-
struction of the Married Women's Property Act of 1945 and (3) the law of
commercial instruments.
The concept of property held as tenants by the entireties is unique in the
law. Any conveyance of property to a husband and wife presumptively creates
a tenancy by the entireties, and such an estate can exist only where the parties
are in fact husband and wife.2 The estate may exist in both real and personal
propertyS In contrast to a joint tenancy and tenancy in common, each spouse in
a tenancy by the entireties is seized of the whole or entirety and not of any part.
It is held per tout et non per my. 4 Thus, it rests on the legal unity of husband and
wife. On the death of either spouse, the whole of the estate passes to the surviving
spouse.5 Other than by a joint conveyance of the property, the estate ordinarily
I Act of May 17, 1945, PL 625, §§ 1 and 2, as amended, Act of May 31, 1947, PL 60; Act
of August 24, 1951, PL 1416, 48 PS 31, 32.
2 Branberry's Estate, 156 Pa. 628, 27 A. 405, 22 L.R.A. 594 (1893); David Young's Estate,
166 Pa. 645, 31 A. 373 (1895).
8 Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings & Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 A. 624 (1938); Wilbur Trust
Co. v. Knadler, 322 Pa. 17, 185 A. 319 (1936) ; Loesch's Estate, 322 Pa. 105, 185 A. 191 (1936);
Klenke's Estate, 210 Pa. 572, 60 A. 166 (1905).
4 2 Blackstone, Commentaries 182; Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings & Trust Co., n. 3, rupra;
Meyer's Estate, 232 Pa. 89, 81 A. 145 (1911); McCurdy v. Canning, 64 Pa. 39 (1870).
5 C.I.T. Corp. v. Flint, 333 Pa. 350, 5 A.2d 126, 121 A.L.R. 1026 (1939) ; Alles v. Lyon, 216
Pa. 604, 66 A. 81 (1907); Boyertown Nat. bank v. Hartman, 147 Pa. 558, 23 A. 842 (1892).
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cannot be terminated during the lives of the parties, unless the marriage r'elation-
ship itself is destroyed.6
Because of this concept of unity or entirety, it follows that a creditor of one
spouse cannot execute on the property while both spouses are living. At most, a
creditor of one spouse obtains a contingent expectancy, a potential lien which
may be realized only if the debtor-spouse survives.7 This potential lien is lost,
however, if the parties alienate the estate during their lives, and such a convey-
ance is not fraudulent as to creditors of either spouse. 8
The estate is liable for the joint debts of the spouses and hence is subject
to execution by a judgment creditor, provided such judgment has been rendered
against husband and wife jointly.9  The reasoning was well stated by a North
Carolina Court:
"Thus a judgment against the husband and wife jointly is a judgment by
the entirety, and therefore a lien upon real estate held by them as tenants by the
entireties. "10
It follows that separate judgments against a husband and wife would not
be a judgment by the entirety, and hence would not operate as a lien on an estate
by the entireties. "In order to bind the land held by entireties, a judgment must
include both of the parties."" Even where the separate judgments were based
upon claims having a common origin, it was held the plaintiff did not obtain
a lien on property which was held by the entireties. 12
It should be noted in passing that the courts seem generally agreed that the
various Married Women's Property Acts' 8 have had but little effect on estates
by the entireties, other than to alter the common law rules on the control which
the husband could exercise over such an estate. 14 The operation of such statutes
generally has been limited to the separate property of married women, leaving
unaffected and unaltered thL basic characteristics of a tenancy by the entireties.
6 C.I.T. Corp. v. Flint, n. 5, supra; Hetzel v. Lincoln, 216 Pa. 60, 64 A. 866 (1906).
7 Fleeck v. Zillhaver, 117 Pa. 213, 12 A. 420 (1887); Biehl v. Martin, 236 Pa. 519, 84 A.
953, 42 L.R.A. (NS) 555 (1912); C.I.T. Corp. v. Flint, n. 5, supra; Mitchell v. Ruth, 30 Del.
446, 55 York 153 (1942).
8 Biehl v Martin, n. 7, supra; U.S. Nat. Bank in Johnstown v. Penrod, 354 Pa. 170, 47 A.2d
249 (1946); Mitchell v. Ruth, n. 7, supra.
9 Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764, C.C.A.4th (1931); Knoblauch v. Kissel, 13 D. & C. 41
(1929); Ades v. Caplan, 132 Md. 66, 103 A. 94, L.R.A. (1918D) 276 (1918); Martin v. Lewis,
187 N.C. 473, 122 SE 180, 35 ALR 155 (1924); Etling v. Pfeifer, 29 West. 73.
10 Martin v. Lewis, n. 9, supra.
11 Arch St. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Sook, 104 Pa. Super. 269, 158 A. 595 (1931).
12 A. Hupfel's Sons v. Getty, 299 F. 939, 35 A.L.R. 155, (C.A.3d, 1924). However, the
court seemed to indicate that, had the claims arisen out of the same transaction, the separate judg.
ments might have operated as a lien on the estate.
18 Pennsylvania statutes prior to the Act of 1945 were: Act of April 11, 1848, PL 536; Act of
June 3, 1887, PL 332; Act of June 8, 1893, PL 344, 48 PS 31, 32.
14 In re Meyer's Estate (No. 1), 232 Pa. 89, 81 A. 145 (1911); Bramberry's Estate, n. 2, supra;
Diver v. Diver, 56 Pa. 106 (1867).
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As affects rights of creditors, there is nothing in the Pennsylvania cases to in-
dicate that such statutes would have any effect on the execution and sale of proper-
ty held by the entireties.
Under the Act of June 8, 1893, PL 344, a married woman's contractual
rights were enlarged considerably, but she still lacked the capacity to act as ac-
commodation maker or indorser, or surety, or guarantor for another. While the
statute was construed by the courts as putting the burden of proof on the wife
if she asserted that she was acting in one of those capacities, nevertheless it was
generally held that when she established such disability, her signature was void
and of no effect.15 But, where the obligation of the wife was incurred in connec-
tion with property held as a tenant by tle entireties, such obligation was held to
be binding on her, regardless of the capacity in which she signed; and, if the
obligation was incurred jointly with her husband, their property owned by en-
tireties was subjected to the judgment lien. 16 In such cases tht courts have rea-
soned that the obligation was incurred to conserve the wife's own interest, and
hence she is a joint maker along with her husband. "The fact that she was di-
rectly interested for her own purpose in the transaction is the controlling factor."'
17
It is apparent, then, that under the Act of 1.893, if a married woman joined
ier husband in an obligation as an accommodating party or surety or guarantor,
the creditor was unable to obtain an enforceable lien on property owned by them
as entireties, except where the woman had acted to conserve her interest in such
estate. Thus, where a husband and wife, who owned all their realty by the en-,
tireties, had signed as sureties on defendant's counterbond in a replevin action,
the court correctly held that the bond was insufficient under the Act of 1893.18
However, in 1945 a new married women's statute was enacted. 19 This act
provides:
"Hereafter a married woman may, in the same manner and to the same ex-
tent as an unmarried person, make any contract in writing, or otherwise, but she
may not execute or acknowledge a deed. . .conveying her property, unless her
husband joins in such conveyance."
This section should leave no doubt as to a married woman's power now to
act as accommodation maker or indorser, or surety, or guarantor for another. There
have been but few reported cases construing the act, but there is nothing in those
cases to indicate any interpretation that a married woman would still have any
15 Southwestern Nat. Bank v. Leibowitz, 320 Pa. 410, 182 A. 695 (1936); DeFeo v. DiBacco,
162 Pa. Super. 608, 60 A.2d 597 (1948) ; FirstNat. Bank of Verona for Use of Laris v. Walsh,
349 Pa. 241, 37 A.2d 130 (1944). But where the doctrine of laches would apply, the court
held a wife's accommodation note voidable, and not void. Wilkes-Barre Deposit & Savings Bank
v. Herman, 334 Pa. 560, 6 A.2d 496 (1939).
16 Archbald v. Hood, 332 Pa. 434, 186 A. 791 (1936); Penna. Trust Co. v. Koller, 319 Pa.
249, 178 A. 814 (1935); Morris v. Duers, 90 Pa. Super. 285 (1927).
17 Morris v Duers, n. 16, supra.
18 Peoples Outfitting Co. v. Eckenrode, 31 Luz.L.R.Rep. 362 (1937).
19 Act of May 17, 1945, PL 625, as amended, Act of May 31, 1947, PL 60; Act of August 24,
1951, PL 1416, 48 PS 31, 32,
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contractual disabilities. "The Act of 1945... empowered a wife to make any con-
tract that could be validly made by an unmarried woman and removed the ex-
ception that she could not become an accommodation maker or endorser or surety
for another." 20 This is in line with the liberal construction given the prior Mar-
ried Women's Property Acts by the courts.
21
There are some decisions, subsequent in date to the Married Women's Act
of 1945, in which a married woman's defense to an obligation as accommodation
indorser or maker, or surety or guarantor, has been recognized.22 However, it
will be noted that in each of these cases the obligation in question had been in-
curred prior to the act, so that the Act of 1893, and not the Act of 1945, was ap-
plicable.
On the basis of the foregoing, then, there is nothing about the peculiar na-
ture of a tenancy by the entireties, nor are there remaining any contractual disabili-
ties of a married woman (excepting the power to convey property without her
husband's joinder) that would protect an estate by the entireties from a lien of a
judgment against both husband and wife, when the husband and wife were ac-
commodation parties, or sureties or guarantors to an instrument. It remains to be
seen whether there is anything peculiar to the law of commercial instruments
that would prevent a creditor from securing a lien on a tenancy by the entirety
where its owners have executed or indorsed some instrument.
Section 68 of the Negotiable Instruments Law28 provides:
"As respects one another, indorsers are liable, prima facie, in the order in
which they indorse; but evidence is admissible to show that as between or among
themselves they have agreed otherwise. Joint payees or joint indorsees who
indorse are deemed to indorse jointly and severally."
Ordinarily, then, the, liability of indorsers, in the absence of special agree-
mont, is successive and not joint. It is difficult to believe that the framers of the
Negotiable Instruments Law intended that this relationship could be proved only
by agreement between the parties and not by circumstances. In a New York case
it appeared that a mother, her son, and a third person signed as accommodation in-
dorsers on a note of a corporation in which they owned most of the outstanding
stock. The court said the circumstances were sufficient "at least to raise a ques-
tion of fact, as to whether it was not the intention of the parties to become joint-
ly liable as sureties for the corporation. " 2 4
20 Palatucci v. Woodland, 166 Pa. Super. 315, 70 A.2d 674 (1950).
21 Heitz v. Bridge et ux., 155 Pa. Super. 655, 39 A.2d 287 (1944).
22 DeFeo v. DiBacco, n. 15, supra; Brubaker v. Brubaker, 53 D. & C. 463 (1945); Hucke v.
McMullin, 66 Montg. 145 (1950).
28 Act of May 16, 1901, PL 194, c. 1, Art. 5, § 68, 56 PS 159.
24 Strasburger v. Myer Strasburger & Co., 167 App. Div. 198, 152 N.Y.S. 757 (1915).
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The factual situation there was quite similar to that in a Pennsylvania case,26
decided under the Negotiable Instruments Law. The Pennsylvania court pointed
out that it is necessary to consider the relationship of the parties to the purpose
of the note aid to each other. It concluded that, from such relationship, the draw.
er and the several indorsers on the note in question were in a relationship of co-
sureties and hence jointly liable. 26 "There is no impelling reason why parties who
sign as indorsers for a common debtor should be deprived of some of the fruits
of a matured law of suretyship merely because they happened to sign as indorsers
of a negotiable instrument." 27 By analogy there is no reason why a husband and
wife who indorse a note should not be regarded as assuming a joint obligation.
It would seem that the same argument could be developed by analogy to the
second sentence of Section 68 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which states
that "joint payees or joint indorsees who indorse are deemed to indorse jointly
and severally." The circumstances of a husband and wife indorsing a note as
anomalous or accommodation indorsers would seem to be analogous to where two
or more payees indorse. The reasoning behind this provision must be that joint
payees who indorse with the knowledge of each .other do so with the intent of
being jointly and severally liable.
This analogy is strengthened by the Uniform Commercial Code. 28 While
Section 3-414 (2) substantially reenacts Section 68 of the Negotiable Instru-
nients Law, 29 Section 3-119 (e) provides that "unless the instrument otherwise
specifies two or more persons who sign in the same capacity and as a part of the
same transaction are jointly and severally liable, even though the instrument con-
tains such words as 'I promise to pay.' " In the framers' comment on Section 3-119
(e) of the Uniform Commercial Code, it is stated that the rule "applies to any
two or more persons who sign in the same capacity, whether as makers, drawers,
acceptors or guarantors."80
Certainly, where a husband and wife are accommodation makers on a non-
negotiable instrument, as for instance on a replevin bond, (or, for that matter
on a negotiable instrument) and where they own property as tenants by the en-
tireties, there is no reason why a court should not be willing to take such a bond,
25 Marquardt's Estate, 251 Pa. 73, 95 A. 917 (1915). This case was cited and relied upon in a simi-
lar situation by the court in Reeder v. Union Trust Co. et. al., 34 Lanc.L.R. 194 (1917).
26 Ibid.
27 Britton, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF BILLS AND NoTEs, § 235, p. 965, (1943).
28 A uniform code designed to replace, or at least supplement and clarify, the Uniform Negoti-
able Instruments, Sales, Bills of Lading, Warehouse Receipts, Stock Transfer, Conditional Sales
and Trust Receipts Acts. It was proposed by the American Law Institute in joint session with the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws May 20, 1950, adopted in final
form in September 1951, and is presently being urged upon the various state legislatures for
enactment.
29 § 3-414 (2), Uniform Commercial Code: "Unless they otherwise agree, indorsers are liable
to one another in the order in which they indorse, which is presumed to be the order in which
their signatures appear on the instrument."
80 Proposed final draft, Spring, 1950, p. 314.
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provided, of course, their estate by the entireties offered adequate security.
There is nothing in our statutes to support an opposite view. It is significant that
the court in Peoples Outfitting Co. v. Eckenrode8' merely declared the wife's
signature void under the Act of 1893.
There was no intimation that, had her signature as a co-surety been valid,
the bond would not have been acceptable. It seems probable that had the court
felt that such a joint obligation, even if valid, would not have created a lien on
their property by entireties, it would have mentioned such a view.
The conclusion is inescapable. When a husband and wife sign an instru-
ment jointly as accommodation indorsers or otherwise, they have prima facie as-
sumed a joint obligation. And when they have assumed a joint obligation, as
already pointed out, the judgment creditor obtains a lien on their property held
as tenants by the entireties.
In summary, when either spouse has assumed a several obligation, but not
joint, the creditor of such spouse cannot obtain execution on a tenancy by the en-
tireties while both spouses are living. If the debtor -spouse survives the other, ani
if the estate has not been alienated, the creditor's lien on an expectancy of sur-
vivorship ripens into an enforceable lien, permitting him to execute on the estate.
Where the husband and wife have assumed a joint obligation, the creditor
who reduces his claim to judgment thereby obtains a valid lien on property held
by them as tenants by the entireties; and he does not lose such lien because the
wife assumed the obligation for the accommodation of another, or as surety or
guarantor for another. When the husband and wife have assumed a joint and sev-
eral obligation, it must follow that the judgment creditor obtains a lien on prop-
ety they may own by entireties as well as on their separate estates.
David R. Monroe
Member of the Senior Class
81 N. 14, supra. It will be recalled that here the court refused to accept a counterbond in re-
plevin, where it appeared that the wife was co-surety with her husband, and that the husband
did not own property except with his wife by the entireties.
